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"We've never had the political will and the resolve to treat terrorism as a real foe," observed Ted Price, a former deputy director of operations at the C.I.A. "But now we're at war."
One former C.I.A. officer argued that the agency was not organized to fight an all-out war on terrorism and that other organizations might ultimately be needed. "The C.I.A. wants to penetrate these groups, to find out about the next attack," the former officer said. "But you can never stop all the attacks because you can never hear about all of them. You can't just spy on these groups. You have to destroy them. And that's not what the C.I.A. has been set up to do."
Mr. Woolsey said in an interview on Friday that he had been steadfastly opposed to lifting the ban on assassinations until this week's attacks. "Before Tuesday, I was opposed to anything like that," said Mr. Woolsey, who also supports an end to the restrictions on the C.I.A.'s recruitment of spies with troubling background. "But like a lot of people, I've been somewhat shaken in that conviction by what happened."
The question of whether to change operating orders of the C.I.A., which operates outside the United States, is up to President Bush. The restriction on assassinations is part of a presidential executive order that could be revoked or rewritten. The rules about recruiting spies are part of the agency's internal procedures and could be revised by the director of central intelligence.
But until today, Congress, which has broad oversight powers over the intelligence community, would almost certainly have weighed in on an effort by a president to end the ban on assassinations.
For now, the C.I.A. is not pressing Congress or the White House to support any change in its rules. Beyond quick fixes, the Congressional intelligence committees are also considering more fundamental reforms, and have promised to study closely why the C.I.A. and other agencies were caught by surprise by the attacks — the largest terrorist operation ever launched against the United States.
"I'm certain that we are going to find some significant intelligence shortfalls that contributed to this tragedy on Tuesday," Senator Graham said.
Intelligence officials defended the performance of the C.I.A. They emphasized that while the agency had failed to provide a precise warning of the attack, it had issued repeated warnings — one as recently as August — that the terrorism suspect Osama bin Laden and his network were seeking to attack the domestic United States.
"We have stated on a regular basis that bin Laden had declared that all U.S. citizens were legitimate targets," noted one American intelligence official. "Could we, should we, have given a tactical warning? Obviously we would have loved to."
Others note that the problems exposed on Tuesday range far beyond the C.I.A. and include the lack of coordination of the government's counterterrorism efforts, which are spread throughout several agencies.
Critics say the government fails to quickly process and analyze information that might help unravel terrorist plots. Often, crucial intelligence is found to have been sitting in the files, but is recognized as significant only in hindsight, after a terrorist incident.
For instance, United States officials noted that the C.I.A. had gathered evidence in August that Khalid al-Midhar, identified on Friday by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as one of the hijackers aboard the plane that smashed into the Pentagon, had met with suspect associates of Mr. bin Laden in Malaysia in January of last year. Subsequently the C.I.A. determined that some people at that meeting may have been involved in the plot to attack the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000.
The C.I.A. also determined that Nawaq Alhamzi, another hijacking suspect aboard the same plane, had previously traveled to the United States with Mr. al-Midhar.
In late August, the C.I.A. notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service that both men should be placed on the watch list intended to prevent their entry into the United States. The I.N.S. responded that both men had already gotten into the country, using their real names.
The F.B.I. was notified, and the bureau began to look for them. But too late.
